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Africa: Neither Hopeless Nor Rising
Robert Kappel
The Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank will take place in Kigali, Rwanda, 
from 19 to 23 May 2014. The theme of the meeting is “The Next 50 Years: The Africa We 
Want.”
Analysis 
Most of the 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have registered positive economic growth 
in recent years. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates as well as export growth 
rates have been quite high, and the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) is rising. 
However, scholarly analyses have also clearly shown which factors are impeding the 
economic advancement of particular sub-Saharan countries. Above all, it is structural 
change that has failed to make headway.
  Economic growth varies greatly from country to country in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
more fragile states (approximately 25 percent of all African countries) are recording 
growth rates of less than 4 percent, and only the countries who export natural 
resources top 6 percent.
  Large sections of the sub-Saharan population have experienced an improvement in 
their quality of life over the past ten years; some of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) were even reached (school enrollment rate, life expectancy, health 
care). But the main goal, to decrease the number of people living in poverty by 50 
percent, has not been met.
  A small middle class is developing in sub-Saharan Africa.
  Africa is often referred to as the “continent of the future” because the share of young 
people relative to the entire population is quite high. But the continent’s youth will 
have a future only if enough jobs are created to support them.
Keywords: sub-Saharan Africa, economic development, economic growth, trade, industry, 
social structures, structural changes
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Exaggerations by the Media and Consulting 
Firms
Countless newspapers and journals have aggran-
dized the rise of Africa, reporting that the conti-
nent is currently experiencing a growth dynam-
ic that gives reason to hope, and that the average 
rate of growth among African countries has sur-
passed that of the emerging economies of Asia. 
Consulting firms and rating agencies extol the 
huge potential of Africa and have styled the conti-
nent as the region of the future in terms of growth.
There are nine basic arguments commonly em-
ployed to evince the rise of Africa:
1) The average rates of sub-Saharan GDP growth 
have been high for the last eight to ten years 
and have even surpassed the average GDP 
growth rates of Asian countries.
2) Export growth is sharply increasing, mak-
ing sub-Saharan Africa the new “export world 
champion.”
3) Per capita income has increased, poverty has 
decreased, and middle classes have begun to 
emerge.
4) Africa has experienced an Internet revolution.
5) Industrialization has begun and production has 
become more strongly diversified.
6) FDI is increasing, which will lead to more tech-
nology transfer.
7) The agricultural sector has been reinvigorated.
8) The continent’s youth and natural resources rep-
resent its potential, which just has to be realized.
9) Trust in institutions has grown.
Many sub-Saharan countries are in fact dem-
onstrating positive growth rates and a friendli-
er business climate after many decades of crises. 
The continent is gaining more attention from in-
vestors worldwide. The efforts made by specif-
ic countries in terms of economic policy – includ-
ing striving toward macroeconomic stability, cre-
ating incentive programs for investment, making 
changes to tax policy, limiting the debt and dis-
playing budget discipline – are showing improve-
ment. For example, international rating agencies 
are rating these states’ level of “business attrac-
tiveness” higher than they did five years ago. Fur-
thermore, many African countries and foreign in-
vestors alike are demanding more sub-Saharan 
natural resources. Nevertheless, exaggerated and 
uncritical optimism is uncalled for.1
1 It is interesting to note how often Africa is supposed to have 
First and foremost, the following aspects, 
which have mostly been ignored by consulting 
firms and rating agencies, must be included in the 
evaluation:
• African markets are very volatile. Fluctuations 
in demand and prices directly affect invest-
ment, foreign trade, domestic markets and in-
come levels. Because of this, it is essential to 
track the long-term trends and to resist the urge 
to either proclaim that Africa is rising or spin a 
tale about the big crisis around the corner with 
every slight change in the market.
• Each country in sub-Saharan Africa has its 
own unique history in whose context specific 
political and economic values and goals have 
evolved. Economic points of departure vary 
drastically from country to country – for exam-
ple, between coastal and landlocked countries, 
or between countries rich in natural resources 
and those who have hardly any. But the main 
determining factor of a country’s performance 
is whether and when reforms in economic pol-
icy2 have been introduced. Countries that have 
made substantial reforms such as Ghana, Ethio-
pia and Tanzania are not only distinct from one 
another, but also clearly differentiated from re-
form-resistant countries such as Eritrea, Zim-
babwe and Senegal. There are many states that 
have been stable over a long period of time, 
such as Tanzania and Ghana, but there are al-
so a good number that have remained fragile, 
such as South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mali, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some 
countries demonstrate a high level of urbaniza-
tion, such as Nigeria and South Africa, where 
more than 60 percent of the population live in 
cities. But there are also countries with over-
whelmingly rural populations, such as Kenya 
and Uganda. Thus, the data on averages repre-
sents a skewed picture of the reality in individ-
ual states. 
• Oftentimes, data on the development of Afri-
can states is presented as if these states are op-
“turned the corner.” For decades, numerous reports by the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the African 
Development Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) have been claiming that 
“now” is Africa’s time (see, for example, the thorough study 
by Berthélemy and Söderling 2002).
2 For example, opening markets, safeguarding property rights, 
improving investment regulations, promoting small and me-
dium-sized businesses, reducing inflation through macroeco-
nomic stabilization, balancing national budgets and under-
taking currency measures.
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erating outside the boundaries of internation-
al competition. But in order to capture the suc-
cess and rise or crisis and fall of a given coun-
try, comparative studies are necessary: long-
term comparisons with countries on other con-
tinents and comparisons between individu-
al African states can better illustrate the actual 
competitiveness than can assessments that re-
ly on short-term trends. Nevertheless, numer-
ous journals, such as The Economist, have de-
voted themselves to such short-term analyses, 
which in the span of a little over a decade have 
switched from diagnosing the continent as a 
hopeless case to making proclamations about 
“Africa rising.” 3
Hemmed In: What is Constraining the Rise of 
Africa?
The aforementioned nine points that supposedly 
substantiate the rise of Africa can be countered by 
the following facts and evaluations:4
GDP Growth over the Past Decade
Economic growth from country to country is quite 
varied. The fragile states (approximately 25 percent 
of African countries) have a growth rate of less than 
4 percent; the middle-income states5 (approximate-
ly 15 percent) show a growth rate of 4 percent or 
more, the low-income countries are at 5 to 6 per-
cent, and only the countries that export natural re-
sources are at over 6 percent (IMF 2012). Using the 
growth acceleration criteria6 laid out by Hausmann, 
3 The Economist (2000), The Hopeless Continent, 13 May, 
online: <www.economist.com/node/21519234> (accessed 
10 August 2013); The Economist (2013), Africa Rising: A 
Hopeful Continent, 2 March, online: <www.economist.com/
news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-
greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august> 
(10 August 2013). The series written by Der Spiegel journalist 
Bartholomäus Grill entitled “A Giant Awakens: Inside Africa‘s 
Economic Upsurge” stands out in this regard, pointing to the 
numerous problems, Spiegel Online International (2013), online: 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-series-
on-winners-and-losers-of-economic-boom-in-africa-a-934816.
html>. 
4 See Bach 2013; Baliamoune-Lutz and Boko 2013; Devarajan 
and Fengler 2013; Kappel and Pfeiffer 2013; Sindzingre 2013.
5 Middle-income countries have an average annual per capita 
income between 1,036 and 12,615 USD; in low-income coun-
tries, this figure is 1,035 USD or lower. See classifications as 
defined by the World Bank, online: <http://data.worldbank.
org/about/country-classifications> (accessed 13 December 2013).
6 Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005: 2) define a “growth ac-
celeration” as “an increase in per capita growth of 2 percent-
age points or more [...]. To qualify as an acceleration, the in-
crease in growth has to be sustained for at least eight years 
Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), sustainable growth can 
be established for some countries; however, this 
sustainability cannot be applied to the fragile states 
and the low-income states, meaning only about 
half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are actu-
ally demonstrating accelerated growth.
Increase and Diversification of Exports
Many sub-Saharan countries were able to realize 
high rates of growth in exports, sometimes even 
surpassing the worldwide average. Many, but not 
even close to all of them, took advantage of the 
price increases in natural resources and the ris-
ing demand for both those resources and for en-
ergy on the part of India and China. China’s in-
creased demand for natural resources from Afri-
ca accounted for 4 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
total export growth. The corresponding figure for 
the OECD states stands at 1 percent. The particu-
lar trade dynamics between sub-Saharan African 
countries and the BRIC states7 have led to the for-
mer region remaining largely oriented toward the 
export of natural resources and agricultural prod-
ucts, meaning Africa is stuck in a resource trap.
Per Capita Income, Poverty, Middle Classes
Today, large sections of the continent’s popu-
lation enjoy a slightly higher standard of living 
than they did ten years ago. Due to the high rate 
of population growth, the increases in per capita 
income are significantly lower than GDP growth 
rates. The average gross national income (World 
Bank Atlas Method) in sub-Saharan Africa is 1,350 
USD per year, though there are huge differences 
between countries such as the Seychelles (12,000 
USD), South Africa (7,600 USD) and Botswana 
(7,500 USD) and states such as Burundi (240 USD), 
Sierra Leone (580 USD) and many other countries 
where the corresponding number is lower than 
500 USD.
Regarding the implementation of the Unit-
ed Nations’ MDGs, Africa has shown improve-
ments in school attendance rates, life expectan-
cy and access to health services, though the situ-
ation regarding education and health is, in most 
cases, precarious. The proportion of the poor rel-
ative to the total population has fallen from 56.5 
percent (1990) to 48.5 percent (2010). Despite the 
fairly high rate of economic growth, the percent-
and the post-acceleration growth rate has to be at least 3.5 
percent per year.”
7 The BRIC states are Brazil, Russia, India and China.
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age of poor people who earn less than 1.25 USD 
per day has risen from 376 million (1999) to ap-
proximately 420 million (2010).8 Some 70 percent 
of the continent’s population is forced to survive 
on less than 2 USD a day. Today, every other Af-
rican lives in extreme poverty. Optimists specu-
late that the relative poverty will drop down to 
30 percent by 2030. What is undisputed is that in 
the year 2030, most of the world’s poor will live in 
Africa. High population growth rates are undoing 
the progress in productivity and contributing to 
the perpetual poverty.
The continent’s middle class is still small in 
general, but in the context of the continuous 
growth of the last ten years, the middle class has 
grown in some countries. This middle class is pri-
marily characterized by altered consumer behav-
ior and other consumption patterns (such as the 
amount of money spent on qualitatively better 
consumer products, education and health). How-
ever, determining who belongs to this group has 
proven problematic: according to the African De-
velopment Bank (2011), anyone earning over 2 
USD per day is categorized as belonging to the 
middle class (Melber 2013).
Internet Revolution
The assessment that Africa has undergone an In-
ternet revolution is far from reality. Actually, the 
continent is a straggler in terms of the use of mod-
ern communications technology. The spread of 
cell phones began much earlier on all the oth-
er continents. What is crucial to consider are the 
server capacities rather than the number of cell 
phones or Internet cafés: most of the continent’s 
servers have relatively low storage capacities, and 
servers in general are much more sparsely scat-
tered throughout Africa than elsewhere in the 
world. Even in South Africa, the quality and ubiq-
uity of information and communication technolo-
gy lags behind that of comparable countries. 
Industrialization
Numerous countries on the continent could so-
lidify their positions in the international natural-
resources markets, but their proportion of trade 
8 In his article “Africa’s Statistical Tragedy,” Chief Economist 
of the World Bank’s Africa Region Shantayanan Devarajan 
(2013) proposes the theory that due to the lack of data on 
Africa, one cannot decisively conclude whether growth rates 
are rising and whether poverty is decreasing. He refers to 
this as a “statistical tragedy.” See World Bank Poverty Data, 
<http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSA>.
in manufactured goods is especially low and has 
sunk even further over the last thirty years: from 
1.6 percent in 1980 to 0.8 percent in 2010. Most 
sub-Saharan countries have not been able to fur-
ther industrialize; high trading and transaction 
costs as well as insufficient state incentive schemes 
have hampered industrial breakthroughs. Afri-
ca is the continent with the lowest level of indus-
trialization. Small clusters and zones of industry 
have certainly developed in the cities, but these 
are dominated by micro-businesses in the infor-
mal sector and small and medium-sized business-
es. In those cases where growth can be evinced, it 
is primarily in businesses that are integrated in-
to the global supply chain. The amount of growth 
needed for technology transfer is very small. Most 
sub-Saharan countries are still far from being able 
to make structural changes. Agriculture, the infor-
mal sector and natural resources continue to dom-
inate the economies of Africa, essentially leading 
to growth without development.
Foreign Direct Investment 
The increased levels of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa 
can probably be attributed to the heightened im-
portance of the region in the global economy, even 
though the proportion of global investment is still 
quite low (2 percent in the 1990s, 3 percent over 
the past decade). However, FDI has been concen-
trated in specific, resource-rich countries and fo-
cused on resource extraction. The “trend” regard-
ing industrial investment is at best rudimentary.
Agriculture
Agriculture also played only a small role in the 
growth boom of the past decade. Since the mid-
1990s, productivity has stagnated at a low level. 
The productivity gap between sub-Saharan Africa 
and other world regions is increasing. 
Youth Prospects
Africa is often viewed as the “continent of the fu-
ture” because its mean population is quite young. 
The potential of the youth can only be realized, 
however, if there are enough jobs for them. Ap-
proximately two-thirds of Africa’s total popula-
tion is under 24 years old, and this section of the 
population is generally underemployed. African 
countries will need to generate about eight million 
jobs annually to adapt to the high rate of popula-
tion growth. It is unlikely that sub-Saharan coun-
tries will be able to keep up, because neither the 
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booming natural-resources sector nor the small 
and medium-sized businesses are creating a sig-
nificant number of additional jobs.
Improved Institutions
Here, individual indicators are selectively incor-
porated, such as the World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business (EDB) index. According to this index, the 
situation in some countries truly has improved. 
The institutional reforms have had positive effects 
in many countries, and the political risks are of-
ten not as big now as they were in previous years. 
Trust in institutions has strengthened in many 
countries, but not nearly all of them. The region’s 
high growth rates over the last several years are al-
so a result of improved institutions and enhance-
ments made to macroeconomic policies since the 
1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, institutions in ma-
ny countries display deep weaknesses. This state 
of affairs has continued to be confirmed by nu-
merous studies over the past few years (Bates et 
al. 2012; Kappel and Pfeiffer 2013).
How Well do Sub-Saharan African Economies 
Perform? 
Will the growth of the last several years prove 
sustainable? The following points indicate that 
sub-Saharan Africa has a ways to go in that regard:
• In terms of the catching-up process, most Af-
rican countries are starting at a very low stan-
dard of living. Even given the increasing per 
capita incomes in Africa, sub-Saharan coun-
tries will be able to close the income gap on-
ly very gradually. In order to double the cur-
rent average per capita income of 1,350 USD/
year by 2025, an annual growth rate of 6 percent 
is required. For example, it would take about 
eleven years for an average sub-Saharan coun-
try to reach today’s – relatively low – annual 
per capita income of the Philippines (approxi-
mately 2,500 USD); for Sierra Leone, it would 
take about 25 years. Even the most successful 
sub-Saharan countries are actually much poor-
er than the poorest countries in other regions of 
the world. It should be fairly clear that the ma-
jority of these states will not be able to make 
this leap.
• In most countries, the growth process was trig-
gered by an increased demand for natural re-
sources and agricultural products. These coun-
tries can profit as long as they engineer a struc-
tural change toward industrialization. They 
have access to the resources they need in or-
der to diversify. A certain few countries (for ex-
ample, Botswana) have used their resources to-
ward that end, but most countries find them-
selves stuck in a “resource trap”: agriculture 
and industrial development are being neglect-
ed – production is not being diversified. In ma-
ny resource-rich African countries (such as An-
gola, Nigeria and Cameroon), the overemphasis 
on natural-resource production is compounded 
by institutional weaknesses. The growth of re-
source-rich countries is permanently in peril. In 
only very few countries does the path to growth 
appear sustainable; only a handful of countries 
have experienced a spillover effect. This is how 
certain countries in phases of growth were able 
to post correspondingly high job numbers. Even 
South Africa, which boasts the best current ac-
count in sub-Saharan Africa, has had tremen-
dous problems generating broad-based growth 
(Kappel 2013).
• In the most crucial sectors – agriculture and 
small and medium-sized businesses – a clear-
ly recognizable domestic market cannot yet be 
spoken of. Small and medium-sized businesses 
have demonstrated very marginal growth, and 
almost no growth in productivity has been re-
corded in the agriculture sector. Increasing pro-
ductivity represents an important requirement 
for readiness to compete on a global level and 
for sustainable growth.
• With the exception of exporting natural re-
sources, sub-Saharan Africa plays almost no 
role in the global economy. This marginaliza-
tion limits opportunities for broader-based for-
eign trade. A stronger integration into global 
supply chains would heighten the demand for 
African labor and create new opportunities for 
local businesses. If and when international in-
vestors begin to turn in larger numbers to Af-
rica in order to bypass wage increases in Chi-
na, India, Brazil or Vietnam cannot be predict-
ed. One barrier to that might be high unit labor 
costs in Africa (Gelb, Meyer and Ramachandran 
2013; Fox et al. 2013).
• In most sub-Saharan African countries, the in-
frastructure is insufficient, even though slight 
improvements have been made over the last 
several years (for example, in Internet access). 
The often poor physical infrastructure (streets, 
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ports, railways, electricity) has limited the de-
velopment of domestic markets and of imports 
and exports. The lack of infrastructure is a sub-
stantial obstacle to sustainable high rates of 
growth. Particularly precarious is the situation 
for landlocked countries, in which geographical 
isolation, institutional weaknesses and the high 
cost of trade have a compound effect.
• Institutional conditions have improved in ma-
ny countries, and the political risks are often 
not as big as they were in previous years. Nev-
ertheless, from time to time extreme political 
tensions surface, such as has occurred in South 
Sudan, South Africa, Mali, Mauritania, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Nigeria, 
Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mozam-
bique and Kenya. On the other side, the busi-
ness climate in some sub-Saharan countries has 
improved.
• Sub-Saharan Africa has made some progress in 
terms of productivity; however, this holds true 
for only a small number of countries, as some 
even suffered a drop in productivity. In contrast 
to China and other emerging countries, sub-Sa-
haran African states have not been able to even 
begin catching up. Efforts to bolster industrial-
ization and to improve the technological equip-
ment and qualifications of the labor force and 
businesses alike have so far been grossly unsuc-
cessful. Due to the low inflow of FDI in the pro-
cessing and technology-intensive sectors, al-
most no technology transfer has taken place, 
which has contributed to the overwhelming 
number of African countries lagging behind the 
emerging countries technologically.
In a recent study, Kappel and Pfeiffer (2013) re-
ported on the performance of African countries. 
The goal was to carry out a comprehensive as-
sessment of the countries with as small a number 
of individual indicators as possible. To that end, 
six dimensions were set out for an indicator cata-
logue, which covered fundamental aspects of the 
definition of competitiveness: economic develop-
ment, level of financial development, infrastruc-
ture, institutional framework, level of education 
and market openness. The variances from state to 
state were reported on using a principal compo-
nent analysis, and 42 African countries were in-
cluded in the rankings (Performance Index Afri-
ca, PIA).
• For years, the Seychelles and Mauritius have 
been way ahead of most of the developing coun-
tries, and they accordingly display the best per-
formance in the index. South Africa, Botswana, 
Cape Verde and Namibia also rank high. Heav-
ily populated Nigeria is somewhere in the mid-
dle. Landlocked and fragile states demonstrate 
on average worse rankings than coastal coun-
tries and those with natural resources. At the 
bottom of the rankings are primarily poor coun-
tries and landlocked countries. Most of these 
states are also characterized by civil war and 
fragile statehood.
• Only countries with a high per capita income are 
capable of seriously pursuing goals that would 
allow them to catch up to other countries. Most 
sub-Saharan African countries do not meet the 
necessary requirements in this regard. 
The comparison of 106 developing nations dem-
onstrates that the majority of African countries fall 
somewhere between rankings 70 and 106 (see Ta-
ble 1), meaning that the majority of African coun-
tries are not currently experiencing a “rise” – rath-
er, they have dropped down to below the level of 
most other developing countries. Other ranking 
systems have reported similar results.
Prospects for growth in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca are determined by many “if-then” scenarios: 
If the global economy continues to develop, then 
growth rates may remain stable at the high level 
of previous years. If the race for natural resourc-
Table 1:  Performance of 42 African Countries, 
in the Context of a Comparison of 
106 Developing Countries (2011)
Top 10 Seychelles (1), Mauritius (7)
11–20 South Africa (20)
21–30 Botswana (29)
31–50 Cape Verde (34), Namibia (40)
51–75 Gabon (53), Lesotho (56), Swaziland (61), 
São Tomé and Príncipe (62), Congo-
Brazzaville (66), Kenya (69), Ghana (70), 
Angola (72), Mauritania (73), Liberia (74)
75–106 Malawi (76), Togo (80), Senegal (81), 
Nigeria (82), Tanzania (83), Gambia (84), 
Comoros (85), Benin (86), Mozambique 
(87), Uganda (88), Sudan (90), Cameroon 
(91), Côte d’Ivoire (92), Mali (94), DR 
Congo (95), Eritrea (96), Madagascar (97), 
Guinea-Bissau (98), Ethiopia (99), Guinea 
(100), Sierra Leone (101), Burundi (102), 
Burkina Faso (103), Niger (104), Chad 
(105), Central African Republic (106)
Source: Kappel and Pfeiffer 2013.
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es continues its trend, then the export revenue of 
sub-Saharan resource-exporting countries will 
rise. If the aforementioned trends continue, then 
states could gain the additional resources needed 
to promote structural changes.
Africa is tasked with industrialization. Direct 
investments need to flow with increasing intensi-
ty into industry. Only in this way can a sustain-
able growth occur, one that is characterized by 
the parallel and combined development of agri-
culture, agro-industry, light industry, industri-
al zones and small and medium-sized businesses. 
Only then will the requisite number of jobs be cre-
ated for the large number of young people on the 
continent, which will ultimately lead to a reduc-
tion in poverty.
Essential to this are the further opening of mar-
kets, the safeguarding of property rights, the im-
provement of infrastructure, the reduction of 
trading costs, and greater administrative efficien-
cy. The basic requirement is macroeconomic and 
political stability. In over one quarter of all Afri-
can countries, this basic requirement has not been 
met. One determining factor of this is the readi-
ness of governments and economic elites to mod-
ernize economies, to promote the much overdue 
structural changes and to foster trust, all of which 
would serve to heighten the incentive for local 
and foreign businesses to invest in Africa.
References
African Development Bank (2011), The Middle of 
the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle Class in Afri-
ca, Tunis: AfDB Market Brief, 20 April.
Bach, Daniel (2013), Africa in International Rela-
tions: The Frontier as Concept and Metaphor, in: 
South African Journal of International Affairs, 20, 1, 
1–25.
Baliamoune-Lutz, Mina, and Sylvain H. Boko 
(2013), Trade, Institutions, Income and Human 
Development in African Countries, in: Journal of 
African Economies, 22, 3, 323–345.
Bates, Robert H., Stephen A. Block, Ghada Fayad, 
and Anke Hoeffler (2012), The New Institution-
alism and Africa, in: Journal of African Economies, 
22, 4, 499–522.
Berthélemy, Jean-Claude, and Ludvig Söderling 
(2002), Emerging Africa, Paris: OECD.
Devarajan, Shantayanan (2013), Africa’s Statistical 
Tragedy, in: Review of Income and Wealth, 59, Is-
sue Supplement S1: S9–S15.
Devarajan, Shantayanan, and Wolfgang Fengler 
(2013), Africa’s Economic Boom. Why the Pessi-
mists and the Optimists Are Both Right, in: Foreign 
Affairs, May/June, online: <www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/139109/shantayanan-devarajan-
and-wolfgang-fengler/africas-economic-boom> 
(10 November 2013).
Fox, Louise, Cleary Haines, Jorge Huerta Muñoz, 
and Alun Thomas (2013), Africa’s Got Work to Do: 
Employment Prospects in the New Century, IMF 
Working Paper, 13/201, Washington, D.C.: IMF.
Gelb, Alan, Christian Meyer, and Vijaya Ramach-
andran (2013), Does Poor Mean Cheap? A Compar-
ative Look at Africa’s Industrial Labor Costs, Cen-
ter for Global Development Working Paper, 325, 
Washington: Center for Global Development.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Lant Pritchett, and Dani Ro-
drik (2005), Growth Accelerations, John F. Kenne-
dy School of Government Working Paper, Har-
vard University, online: <http://thestudystream.
com/upload/data/818/hausman_pritchet_rodrik.
pdf> (15 November 2013). 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012), Regio-
nal Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa: Main-
taining Growth in an Uncertain World, Washing-
ton, D.C.: IMF.
Kappel, Robert (2013), Südafrika - Die Krisensymp-
tome verstärken sich, Hamburg: GIGA Focus 
Afrika, 7, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-
focus/afrika> (2 December 2013).
Kappel, Robert, and Birte Pfeiffer (2013), Per-
formanzanalyse Afrika, Studie für die Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Hauptverwaltung Hamburg, Ham-
burg: GIGA.
Melber, Henning (2013), Africa and the Middle 
Class(es), in: Africa Spectrum, 48, 3, 111–120.
Sindzingre, Alice (2013), Structural Change or Path 
Dependence? Assessing the Growth Paths of Sub-Sa-
haran African Economies in the Early 21st Century, 
ISPI Working Paper, 48, Rome: ISPI. 
World Economic Forum, World Bank, and Afri-
can Development Bank (2011), The Africa Com-
petitiveness Report 2011, Geneva: World Econom-
ic Forum.
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
IM
P
R
IN
T
The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies – Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien 
in Hamburg publishes the Focus series on Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and global issues. The 
GIGA Focus International Edition is edited and published by the GIGA. The views and opinions expressed 
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are respon-
sible for the content of their articles. GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors and omissions, 
or for any consequences arising from the use of the information provided.
Editor: Robert Kappel; Series Editors: Hanspeter Mattes and Stephan Rosiny
Editorial Department: Errol Bailey and Kerstin Labusga
Contact: <giga-focus@giga-hamburg.de>; GIGA, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg, Germany
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the Internet and down-
loaded free of charge at <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus>. According to the conditions 
of the Creative Commons licence Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 at <http://creative 
commons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/de/deed.en>, this publication may be freely duplicated, 
circulated and made accessible to the public. The particular conditions include the correct 
indication of the initial publication as GIGA Focus and no changes in or abbreviation of texts. 
  The Author
Robert Kappel, Ph.D., served as president of the GIGA from 2004 to 2011. Since his term ended, he has 
stayed on at the GIGA as a Senior Research Fellow. He is also a professor at the Universities of Hamburg 
and Leipzig.
E-mail: <robert.kappel@giga-hamburg.de>, Website: <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/team/kappel> 
  Related GIGA Research 
Many research projects at the GIGA have dealt with economic development issues in Africa: 1. West 
African Traders as Translators Between Chinese and African Urban Modernities; 2. Entrepreneurial 
Chinese Migrants and Petty African Entrepreneurs: Local Impacts of Interaction in Urban West Africa 
(Ghana and Senegal); 3. The Productivity Effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of North–South 
and South–South Firms: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa; 4. Employment, Empowerment and Living 
Standard; 5. Poverty and Inequality Dynamics and the Role of Social Policies; 6. Globalization of Chinese 
Companies; 7. Micro and Small Enterprises in Developing Countries: Opportunities and Constraints; 8. 
Political Regimes, Reduction of Poverty and Inequality.
  Related GIGA Publications
Kappel, Robert, and Esther Ishengoma (2011), Business Environment and Growth Potential of Micro and 
Small Manufacturing Enterprises in Uganda, in: African Development Review, 23, 3, 352–365.
Lay, Jann, Michael Grimm, and Peter Knorringa (2012), Constrained Gazelles: High Potentials in West 
Africa’s Informal Economy, in: World Development, 40, 1352–1368.
Nolte, Kerstin (2013), Large-Scale Agricultural Investments under Poor Land Governance Systems: Actors 
and Institutions in the Case of Zambia, GIGA Working Papers, 221, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/
workingpapers>.
Pohl, Birte (2011), Spillover and Competition Effects: Evidence from the Sub-Saharan African Banking Sector, 
GIGA Working Papers, 165, Hamburg: GIGA.
Pohl, Birte, and Robert Kappel (2012), Wie leistungsfähig sind die Ökonomien Afrikas?, GIGA Focus Afrika, 
9, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/afrika>.
Giesbert, Lena, and Kati Schindler (2012), Assets, Shocks, and Poverty Traps in Rural Mozambique, in: 
World Development, 40, 8, 1594–1609.
